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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence that managers adjust firm advertising expenditures
to influence investor behavior and short-term stock prices. First, this paper shows that increased
advertising spending is associated with individual investor buying and a contemporaneous rise in
abnormal stock returns, which is then reversed in subsequent years. Second, there is a significant
rise in firm advertising expenditures prior to insider sales and seasoned equity offerings. This
large increase is followed by a significant decrease in advertising expenditures in the subsequent
year. This pattern of advertising expenditures is consistent with the idea that managers are
exploiting the return effect induced by advertising to the benefit of the existing shareholders
and/or themselves.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has found that advertising has important effects on the liquidity and breadth of
ownership of stocks (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004)). This is surprising as advertising
is intended to increase the awareness of a firm’s products rather than its securities. Nevertheless,
there is evidently a spillover effect. In this paper, I provide additional evidence of the effect of
advertising on stock returns. In particular, I show that an increase in advertising expenditures
is accompanied by buying pressure from individual investors and higher contemporaneous stock
returns, and followed by lower subsequent returns. I next analyze whether firm managers are
aware of this spillover effect on stock returns, and report that managers strategically adjust their
advertising expenditures to influence short-term stock prices around equity sales.
There are two potential channels through which (changes in) advertising can cause higher
contemporaneous stock returns and lower subsequent returns. The first mechanism draws upon
a particular market friction – the short-sales constraint. Investors face a formidable search problem
when deciding what stocks to buy, and therefore a simple rule of thumb is to focus on only the stocks
that catch their attention. Selling decisions, on the other hand, pose much less of an intellectual
challenge; since a large number of investors do not engage in short selling, their search problem is
confined within the stocks they already hold.1 As a result, investors’ purchases are tilted toward
attention-grabbing stocks, while their sales are not. Therefore, an increase in advertising, which
raises a firm’s visibility among investors, can boost the firm value in the short run by generating
more buy orders than sell orders. Moreover, since individual investors are more attention- and
resource- constrained, and face higher costs of short selling, they are more likely to be affected by
advertising than institutional investors.
The second channel relies on behavioral biases in the way investors process information. Ad-
vertising has two intrinsic features that make it an unlikely source of information: a) advertising
rarely contains new information; and b) advertising almost never portrays a product or a company
in a comprehensive and objective manner. However, if investors are unable to differentiate stale
from true information and/or biased from objective descriptions, they may react to advertising
1Individual investors on average hold three stocks in their portfolios (e.g., Odean (1999)), and mutual funds hold
around 100 stocks (e.g., Wermers (2000)).
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erroneously.2 In particular, investors may think a firm that appears repeatedly in advertising have
growth prospects that are not anticipated by the market and hence bid up its stock price. Given
that individual investors are less sophisticated than institutional investors, we expect such an effect
to be more pronounced among the former group.
Both the friction-based and behavioral views have the following two predictions. First, an
increase in advertising expenditures should be accompanied by higher contemporaneous stock re-
turns, and followed by lower subsequent returns. Moreover, given that the total investor attention
is likely fixed at each point in time, one firm’s gain is another’s loss; therefore the reverse is true for
a decrease in advertising expenditures (H1). Second, the humped-shaped portfolio return pattern
is likely driven by individual investor trading, since they are more heavily influenced by advertising
than institutional investors (H2).
Given that (changes in) advertising can have short-term stock price implications, an immediate
question is whether firm managers are aware of the return pattern induced by advertising and
take advantage of the return effect for the benefits of the current shareholders and themselves. If
managers are focused only on maximizing long-term firm values, advertising expenditures should
be determined by its marginal effect on product sales. In reality, managers also care about short-
term stock prices, for a number of reasons. For example, managerial compensation is importantly
determined by the stock prices at which their options are exercised and stocks are sold. Similarly,
the amount raised in an equity offering is a linear function of the current stock price. A testable
prediction is therefore that if managers are aware of the stock return effect of advertising, they are
more likely to use advertising to influence short-term stocks prices around insider sales and new
equity issuances, precisely when the potential benefits are larger (H3).
To systematically test the three hypotheses outlined above, I conduct analyses using data on
firm advertising expenditures for the period 1974 – 2006. First, I analyze the effect of (changes
in) advertising on contemporaneous and subsequent stock returns, and on individual investors’
portfolio choices. Next, I examine the advertising pattern around equity sales by testing whether
the advertising expenditures in the years prior to, during, and following equity sales are significantly
different from the expenditures in an average year.
The empirical results provide strong support for all three hypotheses. Advertising is associated
2Huberman and Regev (2001) and Tetlock (2008) find that investors tend to respond to stale information.
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with significant positive returns in the contemporaneous year and significant negative returns in the
subsequent two years. Specifically, the spread between the four-factor alpha of the top and bottom
deciles sorted by annual changes in advertising expenditures is 12.8% (t=4.83) in the formation
year, and -9.2% (t=-3.73) and -6.6% (t=-2.04) in post-formation years one and two, respectively.
The strong reversal pattern suggests that investors’ initial response to changes in advertising is
indeed biased and excessive. In addition, the return pattern is significantly stronger among firms
producing consumer goods (e.g., Apple Computer) than those producing non-consumer goods (e.g.,
US Steel), consistent with the intuition that advertising for consumer goods (e.g., iPod) is more
likely to attract consumer/investor attention.
Second, as predicted, individual investors hold more shares in stocks with larger advertising
expenditures (relative to total assets or sales), and are the net buyers in firms that increase their
advertising expenditures. A one-standard-deviation increase in advertising expenditures, ceteris
paribus, leads to an increase in individual investor ownership by more than 1.4% in the stock.
Similarly, doubling a firm’s advertising spending in a year is associated with a 2.7% increase in the
order imbalance (i.e., buy order−sell orderbuy order+sell order ) among small trades in each month of the year.
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More Interestingly, managers appear to be aware of the return pattern induced by advertising,
and seem to use advertising strategically around equity sales. The advertising expenditures in the
years prior to, during, and following insider sales are 2.9% (t=2.07) higher, 5.0% (t=3.12) higher,
and 4.6% (t=2.50) lower than an average year, respectively. In addition, a 1% increase in the total
value sold by insiders in a year is associated with a 1.1% (t=2.51) increase in advertising spending in
the previous year. The sharp decrease (from 5.0% to -4.6%) in advertising expenditures in the year
following insider sales is inconsistent with many alternative hypothesis. Since the unconditional
AR(1) coefficient of ∆ advertising expenditures is only -0.08 (as shown in a later analysis), any
feasible interpretation of the advertising pattern documented here must also explain the sharp
reversal in advertising expenditures immediately following insider sales.
The analysis of seasoned equity offerings reveals similar manager behavior. In the years prior
to, during, and following new equity issuances, the advertising expenditures of a typical firm are
5.7% (t=2.07), 7.8% (t=3.62), and 0.9% (t=0.46) higher than those in an average year, respectively.
3Small trades are defined as those below $5,000, which are likely to be submitted by individual investors. See
Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2007) for a more detailed description of how the variable is constructed.
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The results again suggest that firms’ advertising policies are partially driven by the maximization
of short-term stock prices.
One alternative explanation of the hump-shaped advertising pattern around equity sales is that,
rather than opportunistically adjust firm advertising expenditures to serve pre-determined equity
sales, managers opportunistically sell their shares when their company stocks are overpriced. One
feasible story that is also consistent with the sharp reversal in advertising expenditures immediately
after equity sales is as follows. New product launches are often accompanied by a large contempo-
raneous rise in advertising spending and thereby can inflate the underlying stock prices. Knowing
that the stocks are overpriced, managers sell their shares. Since firms usually do not maintain the
high level of advertising spending after the product launches are complete, opportunistic selling
immediately following new product launches can give rise to a similar pattern in advertising ex-
penditures as the one documented in this paper. Some further analysis, however, suggests that
this reverse-causality argument (i.e., abnormal advertising causes equity sales) is unlikely to be
the case. First, there is a much weaker pattern in advertising expenditures around equity sales by
lower-ranking insiders, and there is no visible pattern around equity purchases. If firm managers
are trading to exploit mispricing in the equity market, we expect similar behavior among lower-
ranking officers (e.g., the CFO and the CIO) and in the case of equity purchases. Moreover, the
hump-shaped pattern in advertising expenditures is significantly stronger among firms with weaker
corporate governance (measured by the Governance Index proposed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003)) and among those that operate in only one industry (measured by two-digit SIC codes).
Both findings are consistent with the strategic advertising view: weak corporate governance leaves
managers with more freedom to engage in activities that maximize personal benefits, and a simple
firm structure gives the top-level managers more direct control over detailed firm operations such
as advertising.
Finally, although this paper focuses on a particular firm operation – advertising, the findings
of this study are consistent with a related explanation: managers strategically adjust other types
of firm operations (e.g., to expedite or delay new product launches and entries to new geographic
markets) around pre-determined equity sales to maximize the sale proceeds, and these operations
happen to be causing the hump-shaped pattern in advertising expenditures. While this alternative
explanation is perfectly plausible, it is not a competing hypothesis to the one proposed and tested
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in this paper. In fact, these mechanisms have a consistent underlying theme – managers alter some
firm operations to influence investor behavior and stock returns in the short run. I leave it to
future research to disentangle which particular firm operation is the most likely to be affected by
the maximization of short-term stock prices.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3
describes the data and screening procedures. Section 4 examines the return effect of advertising.
Section 5 analyzes managers’ using advertising to affect investor behavior and short-term stock
prices. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The findings of this paper are closely related to the literature on earnings management (e.g., Teoh,
Wong, and Rao (1998); Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,b); Darrough and Rangan (2005); Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005); Roychowdhury (2006)). For example, the accounting literature finds
that managers tend to increase abnormal accruals and/or to reduce discretionary spending in pre-
IPO/SEO years in order to boost reported earnings and hence the proceeds. This paper, in con-
trast, shows that managers are sometimes willing to sacrifice earnings to increase advertising. The
seemingly conflicting choices by managers highlight the potential (short-term) effect of advertising
on investor behavior and stock returns. Moreover, while the previous studies focus on the channel of
investors’ inability to dissect and understand different components of earnings, this paper suggests
that managers also exploit investors’ limited attention to boost short-term stock prices.
The results on manager behavior also complement those of recent studies on managers’ catering
incentives. For example, Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b), Cooper,
Gulen, and Rau (2005), Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007), Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler
(2008), and Polk and Sapienza (2008) document that managers maximize short-term stock prices
by catering to investor sentiment using dividend policies, the number of shares outstanding, and
firm names. This paper suggests that managers also use firm advertising to influence stock prices.
A notable difference from the previously-documented catering channels is that advertising is part
of firm operation/investment and may cause more damages to firm values than the previously
identified mechanisms, as valuable firm resources and manager efforts are wasted.
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This paper is also related to the extensive literature on the effects of investor attention/recognition
in the financial market. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004),
Kaniel, Li, and Starks (2007), Seasholes and Wu (2007), Barber and Odean (2008), and Lehavy
and Sloan (2008) find that attention-grabbing events that attract investor attention – for instance,
abnormal trading volume, extreme stock returns, earnings announcements, index additions or dele-
tions, and hitting price limits – subsequently lead to higher turnover and stock returns. The
common theme underlying the studies in the prior literature and this paper is that (individual)
investors are more likely to buy and own stocks that have attracted their attention recently.
This paper also complements the literature on the return predictability of insider trading and
new equity issuances. Marin and Olivier (2008) find that insider sales negatively predict stock
returns ten months after the sales take place. Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves
(1995), Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002), and Huang and Ritter (2005), meanwhile, show
that new equity issuances predict poor future stock returns immediately afterwards. Both findings
can be consistent with the mechanism identified in this paper – managers significantly increase
advertising spending to drive up stock prices before equity sales, and decrease the spending after
sales are completed.
The closest two papers to mine are Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) and Chemmanur
and Yan (2008). Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) show that advertising expenditures are
positively associated with various liquidity measures, and interpret the results as consistent with
the model in Merton (1987). Chemmanur and Yan (2008) document a similar hump-shaped pattern
in advertising expenditures around new equity offerings, and provide a signalling model for the
interpretation of their findings. The main contributions of this paper are twofold: a) to document
the effect of advertising on stock returns, and b) to offer evidence of managers’ maximizing short-
term stock prices by strategically adjusting advertising expenditures. In a way, this paper both
extends and links the existing empirical findings in the prior literature.
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3 Data
3.1 Firm Characteristics
I obtain firm advertising expenditures (data45) from the Compustat annual tape for the period 1974
– 2006. I exclude observations before 1973 because very few firms reported advertising expenditures
in that period. Data on total assets (data6), equity (data216), annual sales (data12), income
(data18), cash (data1), cash flow (data14 + data18), and capex (data128) are also obtained from
Compustat. Most accounting variables, e.g., book equity, earnings, and cash flows, are constructed
following Daniel and Titman (2006). I require a firm to be at least one year old to be included
in the sample, as the first-year data in Compustat are usually more error-prone. Moreover, since
the focus of the study is the determinants of advertising, I exclude firms with missing advertising
expenditures from the sample.4 I then merge the Compustat data with the CRSP monthly file to
get stock returns, market capitalizations and trading volume.
To mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all growth variables (e.g., annual growth in adver-
tising spending) and ratio variables (e.g., the market-to-book ratio and leverage) at the 1st and the
99th percentiles. Table I presents the summary statistics of the sample. Despite a significant drop
in the number of firm-year observations, the subsample with available advertising expenditures is
similar to the entire Compustat sample in most aspects, with only a few minor differences. While
firms reporting advertising spending have slightly larger sales and market valuations, they report
smaller total assets, indicative of lower leverage ratios. On average, the advertising expenditures
amount to over $41 million each year in the sample and accounts for about 4.0% of annual sales
and 4.8% of total assets. These figures are statistically significant and economically meaningful,
suggesting that advertising is an important part of firm operations. The average annual growth
rate in advertising spending is 23.7% (i.e., it doubles every 3.2 years).
3.2 Other Data
3.2.1 Institutional Ownership
Institutional holdings data are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum database. After 1978, all financial
institutions with greater than $100 million under management are required to report their holdings
4As a robustness check, I also treat missing values as 0 and obtain similar results in the analysis.
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to the SEC on a quarterly or semi-annually basis.5 As per SEC regulation, all holdings in common
stocks greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. CDA/Spectrum has processed all
SEC 13F filings and collected holdings information since 1980.
There are two important dates on each SEC 13F filing – the file date and the report date.
The former is the date on which the holdings report is filed with the SEC, while the latter is the
date on which the holdings report is actually valid. Although the file date always falls on the last
day of a quarter, the report date, or the date to which the holdings correspond, can be weeks or
even months before the file date.6 To address this issue, I assume institutions do not change their
positions from the report date to the end of the quarter; in other words, I hold the shares constant
until the end of the quarter with split adjustment. Moreover, if an institution misses one or more
quarterly reports, I assume it maintains the same holdings for up to the next two quarters.
Finally, for each stock, I sum up the shares held by all institutions at the end of each quarter,
and then scale this figure by total shares outstanding to derive the institutional ownership. The
final sample consists of stock-quarter observations for the period 1980 – 2006.
3.2.2 Insider Trading
Insiders, broadly defined as directors and corporate executives, are required to report all changes in
stock holdings in their companies (including positions held by their direct family members) to the
SEC in a timely fashion. The Thompson Financial (now Thompson Reuters) insider filing database
includes all insider trading activities reported on SEC forms 3, 4, 5, and 144 filed after 1986. To
ensure data quality, I exclude all observations with a cleanse code of “A” or “S,” indicating a
failed cleansing attempt, from the sample. I retrieve three variables from the Thompson Financial
database: the date of the transaction, the number of shares transacted, and the price at which the
transaction takes place. I further filter out observations whose transaction price is greater than
three times or less than one-third of the closing price on the transaction day, as those are likely to
be data errors.
To classify insiders based on their roles in their firms, I follow the simple rules suggested by
5The required reporting frequency changed a few times during the sample period.
6In rare cases, the report date can be after the file date. This happens because CDA/Spectrum sometimes backfills
holdings information if an institution does not report its holdings for a particular quarter. To ensure data consistency,
I omit all such holdings.
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Thompson Financial. The top-level insiders include the chairman of the board, the chief executive
officer, the chief operating officer, the general counsel, and the president. The next level includes
the vice chairman, the advisory committee, the compensation committee, the executive committee,
the finance committee, the technology committee, the chief financial officer, the chief investment
officer, the chief technology officer, the treasurer, the secretary, the beneficial owners, and the
officers of the parent company and divisional offices. For the majority of the paper, I focus on the
top-level insiders, who have the ultimate control over advertising expenditures. As a robustness
check, I also include the second-tier insiders, and the results are qualitatively the same.
For each firm, I calculate the size of insider purchases/sales in a fiscal year as the cumulative
equity value bought/sold by all insiders in the year, scaled by the market capitalization at the
end of the prior fiscal year. A year is classified as an event year if the total insider puchases/sales
are greater than 0. As a robustness check, I classify a year as an event year only if the insider
purchases/sales are above the 10th percentile cutoff, in order to ensure that managers have a
large enough incentive to alter investment policies. To scale the cumulative insider trading by
a firm’s market capitalization is motivated by the empirical finding that manager compensation
is increasing in firm size (e.g., Conyon and Murphy (2000); Tervio (2003); Gabaix and Landier
(2008)). Alternatively, I can also scale total insider trading by reported compensation, but the
data on executive compensation are available only for small number of firms and years.
3.2.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings
From Thompson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC), I obtain all domestic seasoned
equity offerings for the period 1970 – 2006.7 Specifically, I retrieve from SDC the date of each
offering, the number of shares sold, and the principal amount received. For each firm, I then sum
up the number of shares from all issuances in a fiscal year and scale this figure by the total number
of shares outstanding at the end of the previous fiscal year to gauge the size of issuances of that
year. Since advertising expenditures are only available on a yearly basis, both aggregate insider
trading and aggregate stock issuances are computed for each fiscal year.
7I do not include initial public offerings in the sample due to the lack of good quality data on advertising expen-
ditures in the pre-IPO years.
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4 Changes in Advertising Expenditures and Stock Returns
In this section, I examine how changes in advertising expenditures may affect stock returns both in
the short-term and in the long-term. The rational paradigm suggests two potential links between
advertising and stock returns. First, although the content of an advertisement is uninformative, the
act of advertising can serve as an effective signaling device since only firms with high-quality prod-
ucts can afford to advertise; therefore higher advertising expenditures are associated with higher
valuations (e.g., Nelson (1974); Grossman and Shapiro (1984); Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984); Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986); Chemmanur and Yan (2008)). Second, advertising may increase investor
recognition of the underlying firm and hence can lead to a lower expected return (or a higher
valuation) as more investors bear the same amount of risk (Merton (1987)).8
Drawing on a similar insight as Merton (1987) that advertising can potentially attract prospec-
tive investors’ attention, I argue that advertising can affect stock returns through two additional
channels. The first channel is built upon a specific market friction – the short-sales constraint.
Due to the general difficulty to short sell securities, investors are faced with a much smaller search
domain when deciding what stocks to sell than when deciding what stocks to buy. Consequently,
investors’ buying decisions are more tilted toward attention-grabbing stocks than their selling de-
cisions. Therefore, an increase in advertising spending can potentially increase the firm value in
the short run by generating more buy orders than sell orders; and if the total attention is fixed at
a given point in time, the reverse is true for a decrease in advertising spending. Moreover, since
individual investors are more attention and resource constrained, and face higher costs of short
selling, the asymmetry between buying and selling decisions should be stronger among individual
investors.
The second possibility is that investors may draw spurious inferences on a firm’s stock market
performance from its product market advertising, although advertising usually bears little timely
information and is often exaggerated. Specifically, upon seeing the spectacular features of a product
in an advertisement, some investors may jump to the conclusion that the firm has great unexpected
growth potentials, without asking whether the information has already been incorporated in the
8A third possibility is that firms may increase advertising (or any type of investment) when the expected future
stock returns (or the cost of capital) are low. As shown later, this reverse-causality argument is inconsistent with the
data.
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stock price and whether the advertisement reflects, in an unbiased manner, all features of the
product. The bias stems basically from investors’ inability to differentiate stale from timely infor-
mation, and exaggeration from genuine descriptions. The mechanism described here is different
from the signaling mechanism, although both have an element of learning. The key in the signalling
model is that investors infer good quality from the act of increasing advertising spending, while the
behavioral story is about investors’ erroneous reactions to the content of advertising.
All four mechanisms outlined above predict that an increase in advertising expenditures is ac-
companied by a rise in contemporaneous stock returns (and vice versa for a decrease). However,
unlike the agency and the neoclassic models, which maintain a permanent price effect, both the
friction-based and the behavioral hypotheses predict an initial price overshoot, which is subse-
quently reversed.9 In the remainder of this section, I distinguish the agency and the neoclassic
models from the friction-based and the behavioral views by focusing on the stock returns following
changes in advertising expenditures.10
4.1 Calendar-Time Portfolio Returns
I construct calendar-time portfolios to examine the price impact of (changes in) advertising expen-
ditures.11 Unlike most prior studies (e.g., Fama and French (1993); Daniel and Titman (1997)),
most tests in this paper use the accounting data of a fiscal year immediately upon the fiscal year
end. The distinction in methodology is due to the differences in our research questions. On the one
hand, prior studies intend to examine how the market responds to the information embedded in
accounting data; it is therefore important to avoid the look-ahead bias since firms delay reporting
their earnings by as much as six months. This paper, on the other hand, focuses on how changes
in the exposure to advertising affect consumers’/investors’ investment decisions. For example, if a
firm increases its advertising spending in fiscal year 2000 by 20% over that in 1999, this analysis
is designed to figure out how this additional 20% in advertising spending affects the firm’s stock
9The increasing-risk-sharing hypothesis also predicts a reversal. However, the reversal, compared with the initial
price run-up, should be mild. For example, in the Gordon permanent growth framework, imagine a firm with an
annual expected return of 10% and an annual growth rate of 5%. A decrease in expected return of 1% in the current
year will lead to an initial positive return of 25% and a reversal of 1% in each of the subsequent years.
10This paper does not intend to distinguish between the friction-based and the behavioral models.
11To deal with potential microstructure issues, I exclude stocks that are priced below five dollars a shares or whose
market capitalizations are in the bottom NYSE decile. I also require minimum advertising expenditures of 100,000
dollars in a year – this is to reduce the noise in calculating the changes in advertising spending. Using different
spending cutoffs (e.g., 50,000 or 200,000 dollars) does not affect the result.
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returns in fiscal year 2000 (when consumers/investors are exposed to more advertising by the firm),
and the returns in the subsequent years (when the effect of advertising dissipates).
The stock portfolios are rebalanced every month and are held for two years.12 Since firms’ fiscal
years end in different months in a calendar year, I use the last available accounting figures in each
month. So, for example, if a firm’s fiscal year ends in September 2000, its advertising spending
reported for the year 2000 will be used in portfolio ranking from October 2000 to September 2001,
when the firm’s next fiscal year ends. In addition, in order to analyze the contemporaneous price
effect of advertising, I also compute the stock returns in the portfolio-formation year.
Also note that I focus on the percentage growth rather than the dollar growth in advertising
expenditures in the analysis, because the marginal effect of advertising on consumer/investor at-
tention is likely to decrease rapidly as the total advertising expenditures go up. For example, a $1
billion increase in advertising spending by General Motors may have a negligible effect on investor
awareness, as GM is already a well-known national company; however, a $1 millon increase in
advertising spending by a small software company may go a long way to reach out to potential
investors.
Table II presents the equal-weighted returns to the calendar-time portfolios. In Panel A, I sort all
stocks into deciles based on ∆ads at the end of each month, where ∆ads = log(adst)− log(adst−1)
and adst is the advertising expenditures in fiscal year t.13 Consistent with all four views, the
difference between four-factor alpha of the top and bottom deciles sorted by changes in advertising
expenditures is 12.8% (t=4.83) in the formation year, implying a positive relationship between ∆ads
and contemporaneous stock returns. The alpha spreads in the subsequent years are significantly
negative, -9.2% (t=-3.73) and -6.6% (t=-2.04) in years one and two, respectively. In other words, the
total positive spread earned by the long-short portfolio in the formation year is completely reversed
in the subsequent two years.14 The quick and complete reversal pattern observed in the data speaks
directly to the reverse causality critique (i.e., advertising expenditures chase contemporaneous stock
returns); it is also inconsistent with the agency and the neoclassic models. In sum, the stock return
12To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holding month, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to take the
equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different months.
13In untabulated results, portfolios sorted by ∆ adst
assetst−1 = log(
adst
assetst−1 ) − log(
adst−1
assetst−2 ) generate very similar
return spreads.
14A value-weighted fully-tradable strategy (in which portfolios are formed six months after fiscal year ends) yields
a four-factor alpha spread of 0.49% per month (significant at the 5% level) in the following year.
13
pattern in the three-year period documented above supports the predictions of the friction-based
and the behavioral views.
Panels B-E conduct further robustness checks. In all these tests, portfolios are formed six months
after fiscal year ends to comply with the prior literature, and are held for one year. Panel B employs
two alternative definitions of the sorting variable – industry-adjusted advertising expenditures and
advertising expenditures scaled by total sales. The results are qualitatively the same as in Panel
A, suggesting that the return pattern is not driven by industry differences or by changes in sales.
Panel C separates firms into two groups. The first group includes firms producing consumer
goods (e.g., personal electronics) and the second group producing non-consumer goods (e.g., raw
materials).15 I then conduct the same calendar-time portfolio analysis on both groups. Since
advertising of consumer goods (e.g., Apple iPod) is more likely to draw attention from con-
sumers/investors than advertising of non-consumer goods (e.g., US Steel), we expect the return
effect induced by advertising to be significantly stronger among the former group. The results are
consistent with this prediction. the spread in four-factor alpha among firms producing consumer
goods is -11.64% in the subsequent year, while that among firms producing non-consumer goods is
-6.36%. The difference between the two groups, -5.28%, is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Panel D reports a similar exercise. At the end of each fiscal year, firms are sorted into two
groups based on institutional ownership.16 Since individual investors are more likely to be attention
constrained and therefore affected by advertising, the return effect induced by advertising should be
more pronounced among stocks that are more likely to be individual investors’ preferred habitat.17
The prediction is again corroborated by the data. The return spread in the subsample of stocks
with greater individual investor ownership is significantly stronger than the sample of stocks that
are held more by institutional investors.
Finally, Panel E checks the robustness of the return effect in two subperiods. I choose year
1995 as the cutoff year, because a new statement of position, SOP 93-7 (Reporting on Advertising
Costs), became effective in 1994. The SOP was issued by the Accounting Standards Executive
Committee, and changed the practices used by companies to expense the cost of advertising. The
15Consumer and non-consumer industries are classified based on the five-industry definition provided by Kenneth
French.
16It is known that institutional ownership is highly correlated with firm size. To remove the size effect, I use
residual institutional ownership that is orthogonal to firm size in the sorting procedure.
17The preferred habitat view is introduced in Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005).
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results in the two subsamples are qualitatively the same, and are both statistically significant. To
sum up, Table II shows a robust hump-shaped return pattern associated with firm advertising;
overall, the return effect is more consistent with the friction-based and the behavioral views than
the agency and neo-classic models.
4.2 Regression Approach
The calendar-time portfolio approach can be boiled down to a univariate regression analysis. To
address the confounding effects of other variables that are known to predict stock returns, I conduct
a multivariate regression analysis.
4.2.1 Determinants of ∆Advertising
I first examine what firm characteristics are related to changes in advertising expenditures. Growth
in assets, sales, and investment are expected to be positively associated with advertising expendi-
tures. The firm age may also be important, as advertising expenditures are likely to grow faster in
the beginning of a firm’s life circle and slow down as the firm matures.
Table III reports the following regression analysis of ∆ads:
∆adsi,t =β0 + β1 ∆adsi,t−1 + β2 ∆assetsi,t−1 + β3 ∆salesi,t−1 + β4 ∆capexi,t−1+
β5 log(mei,t−1) + β6 mbi,t−1 + β7 reti,t−1 + β8 log(agei,t−1)+ (1)
β9 ∆assetsi,t + β10 ∆salesi,t + β11 ∆capexi,t,
where ∆adsi,t = log(adsi,t) − log(adsi,t−1); ∆assetsi,t, ∆salesi,t, and ∆capexi,t are defined simi-
larly; reti,t is the cumulative return in fiscal year t; mei,t, mbi,t, and agei,t are the total market
capitalization, the market-to-book ratio, and the firm age measured at the end of the fiscal year t,
respectively. The coefficients are estimated using both the Fama-MacBeth approach and a pooled
OLS regression with year fixed effects.
As predicted, firms that experience larger growth in assets, sales, and investment, or have better
stock market performance in the previous year significantly increase their advertising expenditures
in the subsequent year, perhaps due to some general improvement in its operating environment.
Moreover, firm age is negatively related to the growth in advertising spending, consistent with the
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firm life-cycle view. There is also a significant negative autocorrelation in ∆ads (although small in
magnitude); a 1% increase in advertising spending in the prior year predicts a 0.08% decrease in
the next year. One possibility is that firm advertising expenditures move in a cycle; for example,
a firm increases its spending in advertising during a new product launch or a major strategic shift
and scales back its spending subsequently.
4.2.2 Fama-MacBeth Return Regression
I then conduct the following stock-return regression:
reti,s =β0 + β1 ∆adsi,t−1 + β2 ∆adsi,t−2 + β3 ∆adsi,t + β4 ∆assetsi,t−1 + β5 ∆salesi,t−1+
β6 ∆capexi,t−1 + β7 log(mei,t−1) + β8 mbi,t−1 + β9 reti,t−1 + β10 reti,(t−4:t−2)+ (2)
β11 τi,(t−4:t−1) + β12 log(agei,t−1) + β13 turnoveri,t−1 + β14 accrualsi,t−1,
where reti,s is the return in month s of year t; reti,t−1 and reti,(t−4:t−2) are the cumulative stock
returns in year t-1 and years t-4 to t-2, respectively; and turnoveri,t−1 is the average monthly
exchange-adjusted share turnover in fiscal year t-1. τi,(t−4:t−1) is the aggregate equity issuance in
years t-4 to t-1, defined in Daniel and Titman (2006). accrualsi,t−1 is the discretionary accruals
in year t-1, introduced in Sloan (1996).18 Similar to the calendar-time portfolio approach, I use
the last available accounting figures in each month and conduct monthly regressions in the spirit
of Fama and MacBeth (1973). I also control for the average share turnover in the same year as
∆ads is measured in the regression, to address the possibility that advertising affects stock returns
because it affects the liquidity of the stock.19
The results are presented in table IV. As shown in Columns [1]–[4], after controlling for known
predictors of stock returns (e.g., the market-to-book ratio, past stock returns, past turnover, and
etc.), we still observe significant negative return predictability of ∆ads. Specifically, doubling
advertising expenditures in a year, ceteris paribus, leads to a lower stock return of 0.24% per
month in the subsequent year, both statistically and economically significant.
To test the possibility that the negative return predictability of ∆adsi,t−1 is completely driven by
18accrualst =
(∆Data4t−∆Data1t)−(∆Data5t−∆Data34t−∆Data71t)−Data14t
Data6t−1 .
19Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that larger advertising expenditures are associated with greater stock
liquidity.
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the negative autocorrelation in ∆ads, I include ∆adsi,t and ∆adsi,t−2 in the regression specifications
and report the results in Columns [5]–[7]. The coefficients of both ∆adsi,t−1 and ∆adsi,t−2 are
significantly negative, confirming the findings from the calendar-time portfolio analysis that the
return reversal lasts for about two years.
In sum, these results indicate that the negative return predictability of ∆ads is unlikely to be
caused by common risk factors, previously known return anomalies, or the negative autocorrelation
in the variable; rather it is consistent with models based on investor inattention and biased responses
to advertising.
4.3 Individual Investor Holding and Trading Decisions
Given the significant return effect of advertising, an immediate question is which group of investors
are more likely to be affected by advertising and hence are responsible for this return pattern.
Both the market-friction-based and the behavioral views predict that it is the individual investors.
Since individual investors have less access to resources, are more constrained from short selling,
and are less financially sophisticated, they are more susceptible to the attention-grabbing effect of
advertising and are also more likely to mistake stale and biased information for useful stock-picking
signals. This section directly tests this prediction by analyzing the holding and trading decisions
of the two groups of investors in response to (changes in) firm advertising policies.
4.3.1 Percentage of Institutional Ownership
I first examine how (individual) investors’ holding decisions are related to advertising expenditures.
If individual investors are more vulnerable to the influence of advertising, we expect firms with
larger advertising expenditures to be held more by individual investors; or in other words, to have
smaller institutional ownership. Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), I include an array of
firm characteristics that are related to institutional holdings in the analysis, such as firm size, the
market-to-book ratio, past returns, firm age, turnover, and the stock return volatility:
%instowni,t =β0 + β1 log(adsi,t) + β2 log(assetsi,t) + β3 log(salesi,t) + β4 log(mei,t)+
β5 mbi,t + β6 reti,t + β7 log(agei,t) + β8 turnoveri,t + β9 volatilityi,t, (3)
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where %instowni,t is the total shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares out-
standing at the end of year t. For firms whose fiscal years do not end at the end of a quarter, I
use the institutional ownership from the closest quarter after the end of the fiscal year. volatilityi,t
is the monthly return volatility in year t. Since some unidentified firm characteristics may be re-
lated to both advertising expenditures and institutional ownership (e.g., firms producing consumer
products generally spend more on advertising and meanwhile attract more individual investors), I
include firm-fixed effects in the regression specification, and only focus on the within-firm varia-
tions in advertising expenditures. Moreover, I also include year dummies in the regression to absorb
market-wide fluctuations in advertising expenditures.
Table V presents the regression results. Consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001), I find
that institutional investors have a strong preference for larger (measured using total assets, sales,
or market values), more mature, more liquid, and less volatile stocks. They also exhibit some pref-
erence for momentum and value stocks. Interestingly, although advertising is positively associated
with firm size, it is significantly and negatively related to institutional ownership.20 All else equal, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the logarithm of advertising spending is associated with a 1.4%
drop in institutional ownership, or equivalently a 1.4% increase in individual investor ownership.
In Columns [4]–[7], I conduct the same regression analysis with advertising expenditures scaled
by lagged assets and sales. Columns [4] and [5] use log( adstsalest−1 ), while Columns [6] and [7] use
the variable scaled by lagged assets. The results are by and large unchanged. In sum, the results
presented in this table suggest that, compared to institutional investors, individual investors have
a stronger preference for stocks with larger advertising expenditures. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that attention is the driving force for the return pattern.
4.3.2 Small-Trade Imbalances
As a robustness check, I also analyze the trading decisions of individual investors. Following the
prior literature, I classify trades smaller than $5,000 as the ones submitted by individual investors.21
However, this simple rule to differentiate individual investor trades from institutional trades has
become much less effective since 2001; after the adoption of decimalization at the end of 2000,
20This is the case even in a univariate regression.
21Trade data are collected from ISSM and TAQ. For more details on the construction of small trades, see Barber,
Odean, and Zhu (2007).
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institutions started to opt for algorithmic trading (i.e., breaking up large orders into small pieces).
As a result, I limit my analysis to the sample before 2001:
imbali,s =β0 + β1 ∆adsi,t + β2 ∆adsi,t−1 + β3 ∆assetsi,t−1 + β4 ∆salesi,t−1+
β5 log(mei,t−1) + β6 mbi,t−1 + β7 reti,t−1 + β8 reti,t, (4)
where imbali,s =
buyOrderi,s−sellOrderi,s
buyOrderi,s+sellOrderi,s
is the small-trade imbalance in month s of year t. It captures
the disparity between buy orders and sell orders (likely) submitted by individual investors. I employ
two measures of imbali,s. The first is constructed based on the number of buy and sell orders in
each month, and the second based on the dollar value. Similar to the analysis of monthly returns,
I use the last available accounting figures in each month and conduct the regression in the spirit of
Fama and MacBeth (1973).
The regression results, shown in Table VI, suggest that individual investors are the net buyers
in firms with increasing advertising expenditures. Specifically, doubling advertising expenditures
in a year, ceteris paribus, increases the small-trade imbalance (i.e., buy orders minus sell orders)
by about 2.7% in each month in the same year. Interestingly, such an effect does not spill over
to the subsequent year. ∆adsi,t−1 is insignificant in predicting small-trade imbalances in year t in
all regression specifications. This is consistent with the idea that individual investors buy a firm’s
stock at the time they see its product market advertising. I also control for the stock return in
year t to address the possibility that both advertising and individual investor trading responds to
contemporary stock returns. The results do not change.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section implies that individual investors are more
likely to be responsible for the return pattern induced by (changes in) advertising. This is consistent
with the prediction that these investors are more likely to be affected by attention-grabbing events,
such as advertising.
5 Advertising Expenditures Around Equity Sales
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) argue that, in the presence of unsophisticated investors and
limits to arbitrage, a fully rational manager strike a balance between two conflicting goals. On
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the one hand, the manager maximizes the long-term fundamental value of the firm (i.e., to select
investment projects with positive net present values). On the other hand, the manager also maxi-
mizes the current stock price in order, for instance, to ward off potential takeover threats and/or to
maximize his own compensation. Although the two goals are exactly aligned in an efficient market,
they can lead to different manager behavior once we relax the assumption of market efficiency. In
particular, if firm policies can affect investor behavior and cause stock prices to temporarily deviate
from fundamental values, firm managers may choose investment and operation policies that appeal
to investors in the short run.
The prior literature has identified a number of firm policies that are partially motivated by the
maximization of short term stock prices – for example, accrual-based earnings, the dividend policy,
the number of shares outstanding, and etc. In this section, I propose and test an additional channel
through which managers may influence short-term stock prices – firm advertising policies.
The preceding sections document a significant return pattern associated with (changes in) ad-
vertising: firms that increase their advertising expenditures experience a temporary rise in their
stock prices, which is then reversed subsequently. If firm managers are aware of this return pattern,
they may take advantage of investors’ limited attention by strategically adjusting firm advertising
expenditures for the benefits of themselves and the current shareholders.22
To detect such manipulative/strategic actions by firm managers, I exploit the variations in the
benefit of doing so; specifically, managers are more likely to exploit the temporary price effect of
advertising when the potential benefits are larger. Therefore, the strategic component in advertising
expenditures should be the most pronounced around equity sales, precisely when a temporary price
increase can lead to the largest gains to managers and the current shareholders. In particular, we
should observe a sharp increase in advertising expenditures shortly before equity sales, and a sharp
decrease in advertising expenditures immediately after the sales are complete. In the remainder of
this section, I study two types of equity sales – insider sales and seasoned equity offerings.
Although equity purchases (e.g., insider purchases and share repurchase programs) seem to be
the other side of the same coin, there is a substantial difference between equity sales and purchases
– the two are likely motivated by different reasons. Take insider transactions for example. Insiders’
22It is worth noting that advertising can also lead to higher stock liquidity (see Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston
(2004)), which is also beneficial to managers and the current investors.
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selling decisions are usually motivated by the need for diversification, hedging, and consumption,
all of which can be forecasted reasonably well by managers themselves. This leaves managers with
plenty of time to make certain “preparations,” such as to increase firm advertising expenditures to
pump up the short-term stock prices. Insider purchases, on the other hand, are likely motivated by
private information.23 Given the timely nature of information, rather than wait for advertising to
take effect, managers should execute their trades as soon as possible. This important distinction
between equity purchases and sales offers us an interesting test for our hypothesis: we should see
a stronger strategic component in advertising around equity sales than around purchases.
5.1 Advertising Expenditures Around Insider Sales
To examine the pattern in advertising expenditures around insider sales, for each firm, I calculate
insider sales as the total equity value sold by all the top-level insiders in a fiscal year, divided by
the market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year. The choice of market-cap in the
denominator is motivated by recent empirical findings that manager compensation is increasing in
firm size (e.g., Conyon and Murphy (2000); Tervio (2003); Gabaix and Landier (2008)); the ratio
therefore captures managers’ incentives to influence short-term stock prices.24 I then conduct the
following regression analysis:
log(adsi,t) =β0 + β1 preEventi,t + β2 Eventi,t + β3 postEventi,t + β4 preEventi,t ∗ amnti,t+1+
β5 Eventi,t ∗ amnti,t + β6 postEventi,t ∗ amnti,t−1 + β7 log(assetsi,t−1)+
β8 log(salesi,t−1) + β9 log(mei,t−1) + β10 mbi,t−1 + β11 reti,t−1+ (5)
β12 log(agei,t−1) + β13 turni,t−1 + β14 volai,t−1 + β15 kzi,t−1,
where adsi,t is the advertising expenditures by firm i in year t. amnti,t is the amount of aggregate
insider sales in firm i in year t divided by the market-cap at the end of t-1. I define year t as
an event year if amnti,t is positive. Eventi,t is an indicator variable, equal to one if year t is an
event year, and zero otherwise. For all years in which Eventi,t is zero, preEventi,t is set to one if
23For example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003), Jenter (2005) find that insider
sales do not predict negative stock returns in the short run, while insider purchases are immediately followed by
positive stock returns.
24I also use total sales in the previous fiscal year in the denominator, and the results are similar.
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year t+1 is an event year, and similarly, postEventi,t is set to one if year t-1 is an event year. If
both preEventi,t and postEventi,t are one in a year, I set both to zero, as the effect on advertising
spending is unclear in this case. The coefficients of these binary variables indicate whether the
average advertising expenditures in the year before, the year during, and the year after insider
sales are significantly different from the expenditures in an average non-event year (i.e., when all
three binary variables are zero). In addition, I include the interaction terms of the three indicator
variables with amnti,t to analyze how the incentive to influence short-term stock prices varies in
relation to the magnitude of sales.
Two confounding effects are explicitly controlled for in the regression. First, since both insider
sales and advertising expenditures have been shown to be positively associated with past stock
returns, I include both the prior-year stock return and the market-to-book ratio in the regression
to capture the effect of past stock performance. Moreover, since financially constrained firms
are less likely to spend on advertising, I include the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index in the
regression.25 This is to address the concern that financial constraints may lead to both lower
advertising expenditures and smaller insider sales.
Moreover, to deal with unobserved firm characteristics that may influence a firm’s advertising
expenditures (e.g., some industries are more advertising intensive (auto vs. steel); some geographic
locations are more costly to advertise (metropolitan areas vs. rural areas)), I include firm dummies
in the regression – i.e., to focus only on the within firm variations. I also control for the year-fixed
effects to remove market-wide fluctuations in advertising expenditures. Moreover, to address the
industry effect, I use advertising expenditures that are adjusted by the average industry expendi-
tures in each year as the dependent variable; and the results are qualitatively the same (omitted
for brevity).
The first two columns in Table VII present the regression results with log(ads) as the dependent
variable. After controlling for all the confounding effects described above, the average advertising
expenditures in the year before, and the year during insider sales are 2.9% (t=2.07) and 5.0%
(t=3.12) higher than those in a non-event year, equivalent to additional spending in advertising by
$1.2 million and $2 million, respectively. Interestingly, in the year immediately after insider sales,
25Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), I define kzi,t = −1.002∗ cashflowi,tassetsi,t−1 −
39.368 ∗ dividendi,t
assetsi,t−1 − 1.315 ∗
cashi,t
assetsi,t−1 + 3.139 ∗ leveragei,t.
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advertising expenditures are 4.6% (t=-2.50) lower than the average expenditures in a non-event
year. One interpretation is that managers are trying to make up for the wasted firm resources
due to the excessive advertising in the previous two years. Adding the interaction terms of the
indicator variables with amnti,t to the regression reduces the coefficient of Eventi,t, and renders
preEventi,t and postEventi,t insignificant. This suggests that it is not whether insiders sell but
how much insiders sell that determines the change in advertising expenditures. More specifically, a
1% increase in the aggregate insider sales leads to a 1.1% (t=2.51) increase and a 0.83% (t=-2.25)
decrease in advertising expenditures in the pre- and the post-event years; both are statistically
significant.
Columns [3]–[4] report the results for the same analysis with log( adsi,tassetsi,t−1) as the dependent
variable. This is to deal with the possibility that some firms simply set their advertising expendi-
tures as a fixed fraction of their total assets or total sales; in other words, the ratio of advertising
expenditures to total assets captures the discretionary decisions made by managers. The results
are by and large unchanged. The average advertising expenditures in the year before, the year
during, and the year after insider sales are 3.1% (t=2.02) higher, 5.6% (t=4.26) higher, and 3%
(t=-1.90) lower than those in a non-event year, respectively. Moreover, the interaction terms of the
indicator variables with amnti,t suggest that a 1% increase in the aggregate insider sales leads to
a 1.2% (t=2.58) increase in advertising expenditures in the pre-event year.
To offer some further evidence for the dynamics of advertising expenditures around insider sales,
I perform another pooled regression based on annual changes in advertising expenditures with the
year-fixed effects:
∆adsi,t =β0 + β1 preEventi,t + β2 Eventi,t + β3 postEventi,t + β4 preEventi,t ∗ amnti,t+1+
β5 Eventi,t ∗ amnti,t + β6 postEventi,t ∗ amnti,t−1 + β7 ∆adsi,t−1+
β8 ∆assetsi,t−1 + β9 ∆salesi,t−1 + β10 log(mei,t−1) + β11 mbi,t−1+ (6)
β12 reti,t−1 + β13 log(agei,t−1).
I impose an additional screening criterion in this regression: if an event year is immediately preceded
by another event year, I drop the second observation from the sample, as it is unclear whether
managers will keep increasing advertising expenditures in the second event year. The coefficients
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on the three event dummies then capture whether the annual changes in advertising expenditures
in the pre-event, event, and post-event years are significantly different from those in non-event
years (i.e., when all three dummies are equal to zero).
The results, shown in the last two columns of Table VII, suggest that the average annual change
in advertising expenditures is 3.7% (t=2.54) higher in the year before, 3.6% (t=3.38) higher in the
year during, but 6.1% (t=-3.60) lower in the year immediately after insider sales than in an average
non-event year. In addition, the interaction terms between the indicator variables and amnti,t
suggest that a 1% increase in the aggregate insider sales leads to a 0.46% (t=1.78) higher annual
growth rate in advertising expenditures in the year before insider sales and a 1.2% (t=-2.61) lower
growth rate in the year after.
In sum, all the results shown above are consistent with the hypothesis that managers signif-
icantly increase firm advertising expenditures in the year preceding and during insider sales and
significantly decrease advertising expenditures in the year following insider sales. The significant
drop in advertising expenditures in the post-sales year helps rule out a number of alternative ex-
planations (given that the unconditional AR(1) coefficient of ∆ads is only -0.08); for example,
the omitted variable issue – both advertising expenditures and insider sales are driven by some
unobserved effects.
Moreover, the dynamic pattern of advertising expenditures around insider sales can also po-
tentially explain the stock return pattern around insider sales documented in the prior literature.
Specifically, insider sales follow good past stock returns, and predict negative returns ten months
down the road (e.g., Marin and Olivier (2008)). That the return reversal does not appear immedi-
ately following insider sales may be due to delayed investor reactions to changes in advertising.
5.2 Advertising Expenditures Around SEOs
I also analyze how advertising expenditures vary around seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Although
directors and managers are often minority shareholders in their firms, they are still motivated to
maximize the proceeds from SEOs. First of all, directors and managers have the fiduciary duty to
act in the best interest of their existing shareholders. Moreover, a higher issuance price means a
smaller dilution of control for the same capital raised, or more capital to spend for the same stake
sold. If mangers strategically adjust advertising expenditures around insider sales, we expect a
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similar pattern around equity offerings.
Table VIII reports the coefficients for the same regression as Table VII, with a different definition
of events. For each firm, I compute amnti,t as the aggregate equity issuance in fiscal year t, divided
by the total shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year t-1 (adjusted for splits). Eventi,t is an
indicator variable, equal to one if the aggregate issuance is positive, and zero otherwise. preEventi,t
(postEventi,t) is set to one if Eventi,t is zero and the aggregate equity issuance in year t+1 (year
t-1) is positive. The definitions of other variables are directly borrowed from Table VII.
Consistent with our prediction, the average advertising expenditures in the year before, and in
the year during a seasoned equity offering are 5.7% (t=2.07) and 7.8% (t=3.62) higher than the
average expenditures in a non-event year, respectively. These figures roughly translate to additional
expenditures of $2.4 million and $3.2 million in advertising in a year. The average advertising
expenditures in the year following a seasoned equity offering are not statistically different from
the expenditures in a non-event year, suggesting that the increase in advertising expenditures in
the previous two years is only temporary. Moreover, adding the interaction terms of the indicator
variables with the magnitude of an equity issuance to the regression renders all three indicator
variables insignificant. This is consistent with the intuition that the size of an issuance is more
important than the mere occurrence of an issuance in determining managers’ incentives to pump
up short-term stock prices. Meanwhile, the coefficients of the interaction terms suggest that a
1% increase in the magnitude of an equity issuance leads to a 0.25% (t=2.38) increase and a
0.36% (t=4.11) increase in advertising expenditures in the year before and the year of the issuance,
respectively.
In Columns [3]–[4], I replace log(adsi,t) with log(
adsi,t
assetsi,t−1) as the dependent variable to address
the concern that some firms may simply follow a fixed advertising-to-assets ratio. The results are
by and large unchanged. the average advertising expenditures in the year before, and in the year
during a seasoned equity offering are 7.1% (t=2.52) and 9.8% (t=4.41) higher than the average
expenditures in a non-event year, respectively. In addition, adding the interaction terms of the
indicator variables with the magnitude of an equity issuance to the regression renders the three
indicator variables insignificant.
Finally, I also test the dynamics of growth in advertising expenditures around seasoned equity
offerings (Columns [5] and [6]). The average growth in advertising expenditures is 11.4% (t=5.71)
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higher in the year before, 6.5% (t=3.94) higher in the year during, but 4.8% (t=-2.98) lower in the
year following an SEO than in a non-event year. The coefficients on the interaction terms between
the indicator variables and amnti,t imply that a 1% increase in the size of an SEO leads to a 0.1%
(t=2.11) higher growth rate in advertising expenditures in the year before the SEO and a 0.3%
(t=-4.91) lower growth rate in the year after.
In sum, this section documents a significant increase in advertising expenditures before seasoned
equity offerings and a substantial decrease immediately after the offerings are complete. This is
consistent with the idea that managers act in the interest of the existing shareholders, yet at the
expense of prospective shareholders.
5.3 An Alternative Hypothesis
One important alternative explanation of the findings in this paper is that, rather than strate-
gically adjusting firm advertising expenditures around predetermined equity sales, managers are
opportunistically selling their holdings when the company stocks are overpriced. For example, a
new product launch is often accompanied by a large increase in advertising spending, and thereby
inflate stock prices; knowing that the stocks are now overpriced, managers sell their shares. Since
the advertising spending usually falls sharply after the product launch is complete, such opportunis-
tic selling by managers can can lead to a similar hump-shaped pattern in advertising expenditures
around equity sales. As shown in the following tests, this reverse-causality argument (i.e., abnormal
advertising causes equity sales) does not seem to be consistent with the evidence.
5.3.1 An Alternative Definition of Insiders
If the reverse-causality argument is correct – i.e., insiders sell because the stock is already overpriced,
we expect lower-ranking managers and officers, who have similar access to company information
as the CEO, the COO, and the chairman of the board, to behave similarly. On the other hand, if
the strategic advertising view is correct, we expect a weaker or insignificant pattern in advertising
expenditures around share sales by lower-ranking insider, as these people are not directly involved
in determining firm investment and operation policies. I conduct a similar analysis as in Table
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VII using the trading records of second-tier insiders.26 The results, shown in Table IX, are more
consistent with the strategic advertising view. There is only a marginally significant pattern in
advertising expenditures around the sales conducted by lower-ranking officers.
5.3.2 Advertising Expenditures Around Insider Purchases
While insiders’ selling decisions are likely to be driven by diversification and consumption needs,
their buying decisions are more likely to be information-motivated. Theoretically, since a manager’s
human capital and financial wealth are already concentrated in the firm, it makes little economic
sense to increase his equity holdings in the firm unless the manager has received some favorable
private signals. Empirically, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003)
find that insider purchases are immediately followed by positive stock returns, confirming that
insider purchases are indeed informed. Since it usually takes weeks to implement adjustments to
firms’ advertising policies and even longer for advertising to reach its targeted viewers, managers
sitting on private signals may not want to wait and risk losing their information advantages. As
a result, we expect a weaker pattern in advertising expenditures around insider purchases than
around insider sales. The results presented in Table X are consistent with this prediction. The
data do not exhibit any visible pattern in advertising expenditures around insider purchases.27
This finding is again inconsistent with the opportunistic trading view. If managers are to take
advantage of the temporary overpricing resulting from an increase in advertising by selling their
shares, they should also take advantage of the temporary underpricing resulting from a decrease
in advertising by purchasing additional shares. That we do not see a symmetric response from
managers suggests that the strategic trading view is at least not a complete description of the
underlying mechanism.
5.3.3 The Effect of Corporate Governance
If corporate governance can help discipline managers, and better align their interests with the inter-
ests of the shareholders, we should see a stronger hump-shaped pattern in advertising expenditures
26Following the definition used by the Thompson Financial insider filing database, I include in the sample the chief
financial officer, the chief investment officer, the chief technology officer, the treasury, the secretary, and all directors
on the company board (except the chairman).
27There is no visible pattern in advertising expenditures around share repurchases as well. The results are omitted
for brevity.
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around insider sales among firms with weaker corporate governance. To test this prediction, I
construct a measure of dictatorship from the Governance Index proposed in Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003). dictator is a binary variable, equal to one if the firm has a Governance Index
greater than or equal to fourteen and zero otherwise.28 I then include the interaction terms of the
event dummies with dictator in the regression analysis.
The results, shown in Table XI, indicate the following. First, among firms with relatively
strong corporate governance (i.e., dictator = 0), the advertising expenditures in the year of insider
sales are indistinguishable from a non-event year; in contrast, among firms with relatively weak
corporate governance (i.e., dictator = 1), the amount spent in advertising goes up by more than
40% in the year of insider sales. The substantial difference in manager behavior between the two
groups of firms highlights the conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. Second, a
similar pattern is absent in the SEO sample. This is because current shareholders also benefit from
higher stock prices in new equity offerings, and hence have no incentive to stop their managers from
temporarily pumping up stock prices. In sum, the results support the hypothesis that managers
are strategically using advertising to influence short-term stock prices to the benefit of the existing
shareholders and/or themselves, and are inconsistent with the alternative view that managers sell
their shares because advertising has already caused overpricing in their company stocks.
5.3.4 Pure Players and Conglomerates
In table XII, I classify firms into two groups: those that operate within one industry (pure players)
and those that operate in multiple industries (conglomerates).29 The idea is that top-level managers,
such as the CEO and the COO, have much stronger direct control over detailed firm operations
in single-segment firms; within multi-segment firms, detail operations, such as advertising, are
likely delegated to divisional managers. As a result, the strategic advertising view predicts a more
pronounced pattern in advertising expenditures among single-segment firms, while the opportunistic
selling view makes no such prediction. The regression results support the strategic advertising view.
The pattern in advertising expenditures around equity sales is either insignificant or marginally
significant among conglomerates; while the difference in regression coefficients between pure players
28I obtain similar results with other cutoff values (e.g., 10, 12).
29Industries are defined based on two-digit SIC codes.
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and conglomerates are statistically significant. Taken together, the evidence presented in this
section is more consistent with the idea that managers are strategically using firm advertising to
maximize the proceeds from equity sales, and is less consistent with the reverse-causality view that
abnormal advertising leads to equity sales.
6 Conclusion
There is accumulating evidence that managers maximize short-term stock prices. This paper con-
tributes to this growing body of literature by suggesting an additional channel through which
managers can achieve this goal. First, this paper documents that investors respond excessively to
changes in advertising expenditures, either due to the short-sales constraint or some behavioral
biases that lead investors to trade on stale and biased information. Second, aware of this return
pattern, managers strategically adjust firm advertising expenditures to maximize short-term stock
prices when the potential benefits are the largest; in particular, they sharply increase advertising
expenditures shortly before insider sales and new equity issuances, and decrease the expenditures
immediately after the sales are complete.
While the existing literature on managers’ short-termism focuses on firms’ financing policies,
such as earnings reporting, the dividend policy, and the number of shares outstanding, this paper
shows empirically that managers also use firm operation policies – e.g., advertising expenditures
– to influence investor behavior and thereby stock prices in the short run. More broadly, the
findings of this paper imply that other investment and operation decisions may also be motivated
by the maximization of short-term stock prices rather than of long-term firm values, a potentially
interesting direction for future research.
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Firm Characteristics Mean Stdev 5th % Medium 95th % No Obs
Total Assets (Million $) 2000.91 21823.68 3.74 81.39 5293.42 54004
Sales (Million $) 1479.27 7760.48 2.76 94.21 5506.91 54004
Net Earnings (Million $) 67.01 626.51 -22.45 2.22 285.81 54004
Firm Age 23.33 10.83 8 22 43 54004
Market Capitalization (Million $) 1281.92 9124.23 2.59 53.85 3720.77 54004
Market to Book 2.52 3.36 0.27 1.43 8.48 54004
Annual Return 15.28% 62.15% -61.09% 2.89% 132.26% 54004
Annual Volatility 14.71% 8.65% 5.24% 12.61% 31.97% 54004
Annual Turnover 89.85% 110.37% 7.24% 50.11% 322.98% 54004
Advertising Expenses (Million $) 41.35 208.02 0.02 1.66 158.35 54004
Percentage Growth in Ads 23.71% 81.03% -55.17% 9.40% 137.65% 54004
Ads as a Percentage of Sales 3.97% 6.27% 0.14% 2.02% 14.45% 54004
Ads as a Percentage of Assets 4.77% 7.27% 0.11% 2.36% 17.46% 54004
Firm Characteristics Mean Stdev 5th % Medium 95th % No Obs
Total Assets (Million $) 2867.08 30876.61 4.60 132.89 8846.92 173592
Sales (Million $) 1334.14 6779.39 1.98 103.89 5104.33 173592
Net Earnings (Million $) 70.58 600.21 -24.68 3.33 294.11 173592
Firm Age 23.62 11.47 8 23 46 173592
Market Capitalization (Million $) 1067.93 7550.47 3.26 73.59 3369.60 173592
Market to Book 2.37 3.23 0.27 1.36 7.81 173592
Annual Return 15.88% 59.30% -58.33% 5.46% 124.19% 173592
Annual Volatility 13.67% 8.64% 4.35% 11.50% 30.82% 173592
Annual Turnover 83.14% 102.77% 6.72% 47.14% 294.38% 173592
Panel A: Firms with Available Advertising Spending in Compustat
Panel B: All Firms in Compustat
Table I: Summary Statistics (1974 - 2006)
This table reports the summary statistics of all firms in my sample from 1974 to 2006.  Data on advertising 
expenditures  (data45), total assets  (data6), equity  (data216), annual sales  (data12), income  (data18), cash  (data1), 
and cash flow  (data14 + data18) are obtained from Compustat annual files. I then merge the Compustat sample with 
CRSP monthly files to obtain market capitalization , stock returns,  volatility,  and turnover.  To reduce the effect of 
outliers, I winsorize all growth variables and ratio variables at the 1st and the 99th percentile. I also require firms to be 
at least two years old to be included in the sample. Panel A reports the summary statistics of all firm-year observations 
with available advertising expenditures; Panel B reports the summary statistics of the entire Compustat sample.
Decile alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 -1.06% -1.03% -0.61% 0.21% 0.17% 0.62% 0.53% 0.41% 0.69%
(-4.40) (-5.28) (-3.61) (1.44) (1.29) (2.68) (2.32) (2.02) (3.50)
2 -0.46% -0.55% -0.24% 0.19% 0.11% 0.41% 0.38% 0.23% 0.47%
(-2.71) (-3.75) (-1.97) (1.02) (0.73) (2.26) (2.13) (1.41) (2.73)
3 -0.15% -0.32% -0.07% 0.32% 0.14% 0.39% 0.40% 0.26% 0.40%
(-1.05) (-2.38) (-0.67) (2.33) (1.34) (1.85) (2.20) (2.05) (2.94)
4 0.10% -0.14% 0.05% 0.35% 0.16% 0.21% 0.43% 0.17% 0.33%
(0.67) (-1.08) (0.45) (2.47) (1.52) (1.65) (3.07) (1.41) (2.80)
5 0.14% -0.05% 0.10% 0.37% 0.21% 0.37% 0.26% 0.13% 0.24%
(0.96) (-0.39) (0.80) (2.67) (1.85) (3.45) (1.63) (0.75) (1.80)
6 0.02% -0.16% -0.02% 0.28% 0.16% 0.26% 0.22% 0.08% 0.22%
(0.11) (-0.94) (-0.12) (1.72) (1.20) (1.81) (1.52) (0.86) (1.93)
7 0.17% 0.02% 0.17% 0.16% 0.01% 0.21% 0.24% 0.05% 0.27%
(1.07) (0.15) (1.33) (1.08) (0.11) (1.65) (1.55) (0.36) (1.88)
8 0.30% 0.25% 0.31% -0.08% -0.18% 0.05% 0.17% -0.01% 0.28%
(1.63) (1.83) (2.34) (-0.46) (-1.19) (0.36) (0.89) (-0.08) (2.14)
9 0.23% 0.22% 0.33% -0.37% -0.27% 0.16% 0.02% -0.04% 0.37%
(1.30) (1.17) (1.91) (-1.62) (-1.22) (0.56) (0.10) (-0.18) (2.15)
10 0.19% 0.36% 0.46% -0.83% -0.63% -0.14% -0.45% -0.36% 0.15%
(1.05) (1.82) (2.32) (-3.23) (-2.67) (-0.56) (-1.69) (-1.46) (0.55)
10 - 1 1.24% 1.38% 1.07% -1.03% -0.79% -0.77% -0.98% -0.78% -0.55%
(4.70) (6.23) (4.83) (-5.14) (-3.99) (-3.73) (-4.57) (-3.06) (-2.04)
Table II: Calendar-Time Portfolio Returns (1974-2006)
year 2Year 0 (formation year) year 1
Panel A: Sort by delta_ads
Panel A reports the calendar time portfolio returns sorted by delta_ads,  which is computed as  
log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ). Since firm fiscal years end at different points in a calendar year, the last reported 
accounting figures are used in each month. The portfolios are rebalanced every month and held for two years. Year 0 
is the formation period (i.e., during which the accounting numbers are computed). In Panels B-E, portfolios are 
formed six months after fiscal year ends. Panel B reports the portfolio returns sorted by industry adjusted delta_ads 
and delta_ads_lsales, which is equal to log(advertising(t)/sales(t-1))-log(advertising(t-1)/sales(t-2)). Panel C-E report 
portfolio returns that are based on conditional sorts. Consumer industries are classified base on the Fama-French five-
industry definition. res_inst_own  is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors 
orthogonalized with regard to firm size at the end of the fiscal year. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each 
holding month, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to take the equal-weighted average return across portfolios 
formed in different months.  Three different returns are reported: the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French three-factor 
alpha, and the Carhart four-factor alpha. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's standard 
errors. Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Decile alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 0.21% 0.20% 0.67% 0.46% 0.45% 0.94%
(0.90) (0.91) (3.14) (1.74) (2.00) (3.88)
10 -0.73% -0.71% -0.17% -0.24% -0.29% 0.11%
(-2.98) (-3.19) (-0.77) (-1.13) (-1.57) (0.54)
10 - 1 -0.95% -0.92% -0.84% -0.70% -0.74% -0.84%
(-5.20) (-4.44) (-4.06) (-3.51) (-3.52) (-3.24)
Decile alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 0.40% 0.15% 0.53% -0.08% -0.03% 0.48%
(1.71) (0.65) (1.75) (-0.31) (-0.14) (2.03)
10 -0.60% -0.86% -0.44% -0.94% -0.64% -0.05%
(-2.31) (-3.56) (-1.66) (-3.12) (-2.32) (-0.17)
10 - 1 -1.01% -1.01% -0.97% -0.87% -0.61% -0.53%
(-4.49) (-4.23) (-4.03) (-3.66) (-2.45) (-2.28)
Decile alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 0.35% 0.30% 0.83% 0.31% 0.09% 0.44%
(1.24) (0.99) (2.69) (1.34) (0.46) (2.19)
10 -0.87% -0.69% -0.11% -0.51% -0.51% -0.13%
(-2.62) (-2.12) (-0.32) (-2.01) (-2.27) (-0.60)
10 - 1 -1.22% -1.00% -0.94% -0.82% -0.61% -0.56%
(-4.17) (-3.52) (-3.36) (-2.97) (-2.39) (-2.12)
Decile alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_1f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 -0.07% -0.12% 0.11% 0.98% 0.69% 1.22%
(-0.29) (-0.69) (0.72) (2.13) (1.64) (3.09)
10 -0.99% -0.78% -0.54% -0.33% -0.37% 0.38%
(-3.78) (-4.35) (-3.17) (-0.62) (-0.74) (0.88)
10 - 1 -0.91% -0.66% -0.64% -1.32% -1.06% -0.84%
(-4.84) (-3.53) (-3.13) (-4.16) (-3.48) (-2.74)
Table II (Continued)
consumer non-consumer
Panel B: Other Definitions of Advertising Expenditures
industry-adjusted delta_ads delta_ads_lsales
Panel C: Consumer Industries
Panel E: Subperiods
pre-1995 post-1996
Panel D: Institutional Owernship
low res_inst_own high res_inst_own
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
delta_ads(t-1) -0.084 -0.082 -0.084 -0.078 -0.076 -0.079
(-8.37) (-8.55) (-9.09) (-6.29) (-6.15) (-6.61)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.286 0.253 0.119 0.278 0.245 0.121
(18.02) (17.96) (10.99) (14.84) (13.17) (6.84)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.184 0.132 0.050 0.144 0.104 0.010
(10.32) (7.87) (2.73) (6.06) (4.40) (0.43)
delta_capex(t-1) 0.010 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.016
(1.59) (1.48) (4.34) (1.61) (1.83) (3.35)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(1.38) (1.27) (-3.05) (-2.03)
mb(t-1) 0.005 -0.002 0.002 -0.004
(2.70) (-1.24) (1.76) (-3.45)
ret12(t-1) 0.075 0.030 0.085 0.038
(12.60) (7.24) (15.88) (7.54)
log_age(t-1) -0.043 -0.017 -0.035 -0.009
(-4.82) (-2.64) (-6.19) (-1.84)
delta_assets(t) 0.115 0.175
(4.42) (8.81)
delta_sales(t) 0.548 0.507
(15.02) (19.64)
delta_capex(t) 0.043 0.045
(7.50) (8.83)
Adj-R2 9.81% 12.03% 25.12% 7.29% 9.54% 22.21%
No Obs 23733 23733 23733 23733 23733 23733
Fama-MacBeth Pooled OLS
Dependent Variable = delta_ads(t)
Table III: Determinants of the Change in Advertising Spending (1974-2006)
The dependent variable in the regression is delta_ads, defined as log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) );  delta_assets, 
delta_sales, and delta_capex  are defined similarly. ret12  is the cumulative return in a fiscal year; advertising, 
log_mktcap, mb, and log_age  are the advertising spending, the logarithm of market capitalization, the market-to-
book ratio, and the logarithm of the firm age reported at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. The coefficients are 
estimated both with the Fama-MacBeth approach (columns [1]-[3]) and with a pooled OLS regression (columns [4]-
[6]). Standard errors for Fama-MacBeth estimates are computed with the Newey-West correction of four lags. In 
pooled OLS, year fixed effects are included in all regression specifications and the standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold 
font.
(X 100) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
delta_ads(t-1) -0.512 -0.382 -0.274 -0.586 -0.362 -0.271
(-3.13) (-3.08) (-2.32) (-3.91) (-3.05) (-2.22)
delta_ads(t-2) -0.340 -0.256 -0.192
(-2.22) (-2.06) (-1.78)
delta_ads(t) 0.758 0.890 0.756
(4.32) (5.49) (5.08)
delta_assets(t-1) -0.748 -0.558 -1.012 -0.796
(-3.19) (-2.90) (-4.56) (-4.08)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.310 0.693 0.241 0.641
(0.94) (2.63) (0.76) (2.43)
delta_capex (t-1) -0.160 -0.107 -0.185 -0.110
(-2.41) (-1.57) (-2.87) (-1.63)
log_mktcap(t-1) -0.017 -0.024
(-0.34) (-0.49)
mb(t-1) -0.025 -0.020
(-0.78) (-0.59)
ret12(t-1) 0.344 0.264
(2.22) (1.69)
ret36(t-4, t-2) -0.022 -0.030
(-0.84) (-1.11)
equity_issuance(t-4, t-1) -0.278 -0.251
(-2.41) (-2.10)
turnover(t-1) -0.043 -0.043
(-0.42) (-0.43)
accruals_lassets (t-1) -3.268 -3.197
(-6.14) (-6.01)
log_age(t-1) -0.144 -0.129
(-1.35) (-1.26)
Adj-R2 0.51% 2.07% 8.00% 1.74% 3.08% 8.85%
No Obs 191566 191566 191566 191566 191566 191566
Dependent Variable = ret(s)
Table IV: Stock Return Regression (1974-2006)
The dependent variable in the regression is the return in each month s  of fiscal year t .  Among the independent 
variables, delta_ads  is computed as log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ); delta_assets,  delta_sales,  and delta_capex 
are defined similarly; ret12 and ret36  are the cumulative stock returns; turnover  is the average monthly share 
turnover in a year; log_mktcap,  mb, and log_age are the logarithm of market capitalization, the market-to-book ratio, 
and the logarithm of the firm age reported at the end of a fiscal year, respectively; equity_issuances  is defined in 
Daniel and Titman (2006); accruals is defined in Sloan (1996).  The coefficients are estimated with the Fama-
MacBeth approach. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on White's standard errors. Coefficient estimates 
significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
log_ads(t) -0.015 -0.014 -0.013
(-3.79) (-3.41) (-3.54)
log_ads_lassets(t) -0.009 -0.011
(-2.65) (-3.37)
log_ads_lsales(t) -0.013 -0.011
(-3.74) (-3.44)
log_assests(t) 0.080 0.050 0.018 0.077 0.016 0.071 0.018
(11.40) (5.97) (2.24) (11.22) (2.03) (10.27) (2.18)
log_sales(t) 0.051 0.039 0.011 0.039 0.000 0.045 0.006
(7.02) (5.41) (1.56) (5.49) (0.05) (6.45) (0.97)
log_mktcap(t) 0.046 0.042 0.042 0.042
(8.29) (7.83) (7.88) (7.91)
mb(t) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.81) (-2.48) (-2.46) (-2.51)
ret12(t) 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018
(5.33) (5.73) (6.04) (6.15)
log_age(t) 0.238 0.233 0.233
(14.71) (14.23) (14.25)
turnover(t) 0.038 0.038 0.038
(13.06) (13.11) (13.22)
volatility(t) -0.375 -0.377 -0.379
(-13.70) (-13.78) (-13.83)
Adj-R2 31.85% 35.44% 41.92% 31.82% 41.90% 31.74% 41.90%
No Obs 21060 21060 21060 21060 21060 21060 21060
Table V: Institutional Investor Holdings (1980-2006)
The dependent variable of the regressions is % held by institutions, which is defined as the total shares held by 
institutional investors scaled by shares outstanding at the end of a fiscal year. ret12  is the cumulative return, 
turnover  is the average monthly turnover, and volatility  is the monthly volatility in a fiscal year; log_ads, 
log_assets, log_sales, log_mktcap , mb, and log_age  are the logarithm of the advertising spending, the logarithm of 
the total asset, the logarithm of the annual sales and the logarithm of the market capitalization, the market-to-book 
ratio, and the logarithm of the firm age reported at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. log_ads_lsales  is defined 
as log(advertising(t) /sales(t-1) )-log(advertising(t-1) /sales(t-2) ), and similarly for log_ads_lassets.  Both year fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Dependent Variable = % Held by Institutions(t)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
delta_ads(t) 0.139 0.061 0.040 0.039 0.126 0.054 0.034 0.034
(7.36) (4.97) (3.82) (3.92) (7.08) (4.57) (3.42) (3.50)
delta_ads(t-1) 0.039 0.020 0.021 0.039 0.020 0.020
(1.81) (1.01) (1.03) (1.89) (1.06) (1.07)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.224 0.193 0.196 0.204 0.174 0.177
(5.75) (6.26) (6.27) (5.61) (6.07) (6.03)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.212 0.154 0.153 0.198 0.144 0.144
(6.09) (5.20) (5.09) (6.13) (5.25) (5.13)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.019 0.020 0.015 0.016
(2.79) (2.87) (2.18) (2.27)
mb(t-1) 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015
(4.06) (4.09) (3.94) (3.96)
ret12(t-1) 0.080 0.079 0.073 0.072
(6.97) (6.78) (6.61) (6.42)
ret12(t) 0.007 0.002
(0.60) (0.17)
Adj-R2 0.66% 2.38% 5.38% 5.81% 0.57% 2.54% 4.87% 5.27%
No Obs 103856 103856 103856 103856 103856 103856 103856 103856
Dependent Variable = Small Trade Imbalance(s)
Table VI: Individual Investor Trading (1983-2000)
The dependent variable in the regression is the small-trade imbalance in each month s  of fiscal year t . In columns [1]-
[4], the imbalance in small trades is defined as the number of buy orders minus the number of sell orders, divided by 
the sum of the two; in columns [5]-[8], the small-trade order imbalance is measured using the dollar volume rather 
than the number of trades. Small trades are defined as those below $5,000.  delta_ads is computed as 
log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ); delta_sales  and delta_assets  are defined similarly. ret12  is the cumulative 
return in a fiscal year; log_mktcap  and mb are the logarithm of market capitalization, and the market-to-book ratio 
reported at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. The coefficients are estimated with the Fama-MacBeth approach. T-
statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors with the Newey-West correction of 12 lags. Coefficient 
estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Number of Trades Dollar Value of Trades
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
pre_event(t) 0.029 0.017 0.031 0.018 0.037 0.031
(2.07) (0.89) (2.02) (0.91) (2.54) (2.04)
event(t) 0.050 0.045 0.056 0.051 0.036 0.035
(3.12) (2.55) (4.26) (3.65) (3.38) (3.02)
post_event(t) -0.046 -0.034 -0.030 -0.024 -0.061 -0.043
(-2.50) (-1.64) (-1.90) (-1.14) (-3.60) (-2.36)
pre_event(t) * amt 1.098 1.176 0.461
(2.51) (2.58) (1.78)
event(t) * amt 0.484 0.456 0.132
(1.08) (0.99) (0.30)
post_event(t) * amt -0.828 -0.390 -1.170
(-2.25) (-0.57) (-2.61)
log_sales(t-1) 0.209 0.209
(17.99) (18.01)
log_assets(t-1) 0.487 0.487
(32.01) (31.99)
delta_ads(t-1) -0.116 -0.116
(-9.05) (-9.04)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.376 0.376
(18.86) (18.87)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.065 0.065
(2.60) (2.61)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.107 0.107 -0.063 -0.062 0.017 0.017
(11.69) (11.71) (-9.23) (-9.20) (10.47) (10.40)
mb(t-1) 0.014 0.014 0.037 0.037 -0.006 -0.006
(7.61) (7.52) (20.65) (20.56) (-3.88) (-3.90)
ret12(t-1) 0.007 0.006 0.061 0.060 0.131 0.131
(0.94) (0.88) (8.52) (8.46) (16.34) (16.32)
log_age(t-1) 0.041 0.042 -0.130 -0.128 -0.017 -0.017
(0.81) (0.83) (-2.57) (-2.54) (-2.07) (-2.13)
volatility(t-1) -0.103 -0.102 -0.119 -0.118
(-1.56) (-1.54) (-1.75) (-1.74)
turnover(t-1) 0.037 0.037 0.018 0.019
(6.51) (6.61) (3.23) (3.30)
kz(t-1) -0.017 -0.017 -0.040 -0.040
(-3.71) (-3.65) (-8.97) (-8.91)
No Obs 28554 28554 28554 28554 21662 21662
Columns [1]-[6] report regression results based on the level of advertising spending. The dependent variable in columns [1]-[3] is 
the logarithm of advertising spending in year t ; the dependent variable in columns [4]-[6] is log(advertising(t) /assets(t-1) ). These 
regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Columns [7]-[8] report regression results based on 
log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ), and only year fixed effects are included. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the 
average monthly turnover and volatility(t)  is the monthly volatility in a fiscal year; log_assets,  log_sales,  log_mktcap,  mb, 
log_age, and kz  are the logarithm of the total assets, the logarithm of the annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, 
the market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, and the Kaplan-Zingales index at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. An 
event year is defined as one in which the aggregate insider sale is positive. pre_event(t),  event(t),  and post_event(t)  are equal to 1 
if year t +1, t,  and t -1 is an event year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Insiders are defined as the top-level directors and officers. 
amt(t)  is the total equity value sold in year t  scaled by the market capital at the end of year t -1. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold 
font.
Table VII: Advertising Spending Around Insider Sales (1986-2006)
delta_ads(t)
ChangeLevel of Advertising Spending
Insider Sales
log_ads(t) log_ads_lassets(t)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
pre_event(t) 0.057 0.001 0.071 0.037 0.114 0.094
(2.07) (0.03) (2.52) (0.95) (5.71) (3.53)
event(t) 0.078 -0.002 0.098 0.036 0.065 0.057
(3.62) (-0.06) (4.41) (1.20) (3.94) (2.61)
post_event(t) 0.009 -0.034 -0.001 -0.019 -0.048 0.049
(0.46) (-1.36) (-0.08) (-0.75) (-2.98) (1.32)
pre_event(t) * amt 0.253 0.156 0.095
(2.38) (2.24) (2.11)
event(t) * amt 0.358 0.281 0.039
(4.11) (3.15) (0.56)
post_event(t) * amt 0.147 0.064 -0.294
(1.29) (1.14) (-4.91)
log_sales(t-1) 0.259 0.260
(26.47) (26.57)
log_assets(t-1) 0.477 0.474
(38.09) (37.88)
delta_ads(t-1) -0.118 -0.117
(-11.61) (-11.54)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.370 0.373
(22.68) (22.80)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.094 0.094
(4.76) (4.76)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.100 0.101 -0.056 -0.056 0.017 0.016
(13.54) (13.61) (-10.28) (-10.32) (13.68) (13.30)
mb(t-1) 0.013 0.013 0.035 0.035 -0.004 -0.005
(7.72) (7.59) (22.24) (22.17) (-3.21) (-3.39)
ret12(t-1) 0.019 0.020 0.068 0.068 0.116 0.114
(3.17) (3.25) (11.23) (11.26) (20.86) (20.43)
log_age(t-1) -0.080 -0.072 -0.197 -0.193 -0.018 -0.018
(-1.91) (-1.73) (-4.72) (-4.62) (-3.10) (-3.12)
volatility(t-1) -0.087 -0.083 -0.111 -0.108
(-1.52) (-1.45) (-1.89) (-1.85)
turnover(t-1) 0.032 0.031 0.014 0.013
(6.13) (5.91) (2.65) (2.53)
kz(t-1) -0.018 -0.018 -0.046 -0.046
(-4.62) (-4.51) (-12.25) (-12.20)
No Obs 39565 39565 39565 39565 39500 39500
log_ads(t) log_ads_lassets(t) delta_ads(t)
Table VIII: Advertising Spending Around SEOs (1974-2006)
Columns [1]-[6] report regression results based on the level of advertising spending. The dependent variable in columns [1]-[3] is 
the logarithm of advertising spending in year t; the dependent variable in columns [4]-[6] is log(advertising(t)/assets(t-1)). These 
regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Columns [7]-[8] report regression results based on 
log(advertising(t)/advertising(t-1)), and only year fixed effects are included. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the 
average monthly turnover and volatility  is the monthly volatility in a fiscal year; log_assets, log_sales, log_mktcap, mb, log_age, 
and kz  are the logarithm of the total assets, the logarithm of the annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, the 
market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, and the Kaplan-Zingales index at the end of fiscal year t, respectively. An 
event year is defined as one in which the aggregate equity issuance is positive. pre_event(t), event(t),  and post_event(t)  are equal 
to 1 if year t +1, t , and t -1 is an event year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. amt(t)  is the total shares issued in year t  scaled by the 
shares outstanding at the end of year t -1. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
SEOs
Level of Advertising Spending Change
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
pre_event(t) 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.042 0.035
(0.62) (0.54) (0.80) (0.79) (2.90) (2.29)
event(t) 0.028 0.023 0.033 0.029 0.014 0.015
(2.32) (1.87) (2.46) (2.07) (1.34) (1.37)
post_event(t) -0.035 -0.030 -0.021 -0.019 -0.031 -0.022
(-1.80) (-1.43) (-1.04) (-0.86) (-1.78) (-1.19)
pre_event(t) * amt 0.123 -0.030 0.650
(0.23) (-0.05) (1.35)
event(t) * amt 0.356 0.380 -0.061
(1.12) (1.02) (-0.20)
post_event(t) * amt -0.335 -0.122 -0.654
(-0.61) (-0.22) (-1.17)
log_sales(t-1) 0.208 0.209
(17.95) (17.98)
log_assets(t-1) 0.488 0.487
(32.05) (32.03)
delta_ads(t-1) -0.131 -0.131
(-9.37) (-9.37)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.385 0.385
(17.58) (17.56)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.087 0.087
(3.20) (3.20)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.106 0.106 -0.063 -0.063 0.018 0.018
(11.63) (11.64) (-9.29) (-9.29) (9.97) (9.96)
mb(t-1) 0.015 0.014 0.037 0.037 -0.008 -0.008
(7.71) (7.55) (20.77) (20.61) (-4.20) (-4.17)
ret12(t-1) 0.008 0.007 0.062 0.061 0.140 0.140
(1.07) (0.95) (8.65) (8.54) (15.44) (15.40)
log_age(t-1) 0.043 0.044 -0.127 -0.126 -0.020 -0.021
(0.85) (0.87) (-2.51) (-2.49) (-2.23) (-2.25)
volatility(t-1) -0.106 -0.107 -0.122 -0.122
(-1.60) (-1.62) (-1.79) (-1.81)
turnover(t-1) 0.035 0.036 0.017 0.018
(6.30) (6.37) (3.05) (3.10)
kz(t-1) -0.017 -0.016 -0.040 -0.040
(-3.68) (-3.58) (-8.95) (-8.86)
No Obs 28554 28554 28554 28554 17708 17708
Insider Sales (Levels 2)
Columns [1]-[6] report regression results based on the level of advertising spending. The dependent variable in columns [1]-[3] is 
the logarithm of advertising spending in year t ; the dependent variable in columns [4]-[6] is log(advertising(t) /assets(t-1) ). These 
regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Columns [7]-[8] report regression results based on 
log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ), and only year fixed effects are included. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the 
average monthly turnover and volatility  is the monthly volatility in a fiscal year; log_assets, log_sales, log_mktcap, mb, log_age, 
and kz are the logarithm of the total assets, the logarithm of the annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, the 
market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, and the Kaplan-Zingales index at the end of a fiscal year ,  respectively. An 
event year is defined as one in which the aggregate insider sale is positive. pre_event(t),  event(t),  and post_event(t)  are equal to 1 
if year t +1, t,  or t -1 is an event year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Insiders are defined as the second-tier directors and officers. 
amt(t)  is the total equity value sold in year t  scaled by the market capital at the end of year t -1. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold 
font.
Table IX: An Alternative Definition of Insiders (1986-2006)
log_ads(t) log_ads_lassets(t) delta_ads(t)
Level of Advertising Spending Change
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
pre_event(t) 0.010 0.018 -0.005 0.002 0.022 0.025
(0.53) (0.93) (-0.29) (0.12) (1.44) (1.57)
event(t) 0.024 0.029 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.009
(1.47) (1.97) (0.56) (0.84) (0.36) (0.64)
post_event(t) 0.028 0.024 0.020 0.015 0.019 0.020
(1.57) (1.30) (1.08) (0.79) (1.18) (1.23)
pre_event(t) * amt -1.547 -1.465 -0.540
(-1.53) (-1.42) (-0.57)
event(t) * amt -0.993 -0.867 -0.822
(-1.54) (-1.31) (-0.87)
post_event(t) * amt 0.643 0.812 -0.305
(0.66) (0.81) (-0.31)
log_sales(t-1) 0.209 0.209
(17.97) (17.99)
log_assets(t-1) 0.485 0.485
(31.86) (31.86)
delta_ads(t-1) -0.113 -0.113
(-8.93) (-8.93)
delta_sales(t-1) 0.363 0.363
(18.83) (18.83)
delta_assets(t-1) 0.070 0.070
(2.84) (2.83)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.108 0.108 -0.061 -0.062 0.019 0.018
(11.90) (11.85) (-9.08) (-9.12) (11.19) (11.05)
mb(t-1) 0.015 0.015 0.037 0.037 -0.005 -0.005
(7.80) (7.82) (20.94) (20.96) (-3.49) (-3.48)
ret12(t-1) 0.010 0.009 0.064 0.064 0.127 0.127
(1.32) (1.31) (9.03) (9.02) (17.26) (17.24)
log_age(t-1) 0.040 0.040 -0.134 -0.133 -0.023 -0.022
(0.79) (0.79) (-2.64) (-2.64) (-2.92) (-2.90)
volatility(t-1) -0.117 -0.116 -0.132 -0.132
(-1.77) (-1.75) (-1.95) (-1.94)
turnover(t-1) 0.035 0.035 0.017 0.017
(6.25) (6.24) (3.01) (3.01)
kz(t-1) -0.017 -0.017 -0.041 -0.041
(-3.76) (-3.78) (-9.07) (-9.07)
No Obs 28554 28554 28554 28554 23441 23441
log_ads(t) log_ads_lassets(t) delta_ads(t)
Table X: Advertising Spending Around Insider Purchases (1986-2006)
Columns [1]-[6] report regression results based on the level of advertising spending. The dependent variable in columns [1]-[3] is 
the logarithm of advertising spending in year t ; the dependent variable in columns [4]-[6] is log(advertising(t) /assets(t-1) ). These 
regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Columns [7]-[8] report regression results based on 
log(advertising(t) /advertising(t-1) ), and only year fixed effects are included. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the 
average monthly turnover and volatility  is the monthly volatility in a fiscal year; log_assets, log_sales, log_mktcap, mb, log_age, 
and kz are the logarithm of the total assets, the logarithm of the annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, the 
market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, and the Kaplan-Zingales index at the end of a fiscal year ,  respectively. An 
event year is defined as one in which the aggregate insider purchase is positive. pre_event(t),  event(t),  and post_event(t)  are 
equal to 1 if year t +1, t,  or t -1 is an event year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Insiders are defined as the top-level directors and 
officers. amt(t)  is the total equity value bought in year t  scaled by the market capital at the end of year t -1. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold 
font.
Insider Purchases
Level of Advertising Spending Change
log_ads log_ads_lassets log_ads log_ads_lassets
pre_event(t) 0.027 0.045 0.032 0.031
(1.39) (1.61) (0.65) (0.62)
event(t) 0.035 0.048 0.057 0.044
(1.30) (1.79) (1.66) (1.55)
post_event(t) -0.045 -0.077 -0.006 -0.016
(-1.67) (-1.95) (-0.15) (-0.38)
dictator (t-1) -0.172 -0.081 -0.052 -0.025
(-1.28) (-0.58) (-0.95) (-0.44)
pre_event(t) * dictator 0.017 0.206 -0.149 -0.238
(0.07) (0.75) (-0.44) (-0.67)
event(t) * dictator 0.392 0.463 -0.191 -0.172
(2.15) (2.35) (-0.94) (-0.82)
post_event(t) * dictator -0.011 0.103 0.075 0.098
(-0.03) (0.28) (0.39) (0.49)
log_sales(t-1) 0.895 0.506
(11.72) (14.79)
log_assets(t-1) 0.128 0.250
(1.78) (4.17)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.027 -0.056 0.034 -0.134
(0.52) (-2.31) (1.72) (-3.33)
mb(t-1) 0.034 0.049 0.010 0.035
(3.33) (5.12) (2.85) (4.73)
ret12(t-1) 0.006 0.044 0.056 0.098
(0.19) (1.29) (3.90) (2.02)
log_age(t-1) -0.108 0.077 0.223 0.164
(-1.22) (0.83) (1.93) (1.38)
volatility(t-1) -1.331 -2.507 -0.213 -0.421
(-2.54) (-4.69) (-1.35) (-2.56)
turnover(t-1) -0.034 -0.040 0.062 0.064
(-1.17) (-1.24) (5.75) (5.69)
kz(t-1) -0.102 -0.143 -0.039 -0.081
(-3.60) (-5.42) (-3.99) (-5.22)
No Obs 6554 6554 6554 6554
The dependent variable in this table is the logarithm of advertising spending in year t.  Both regression specifications include year 
fixed effects. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the average monthly turnover, and volatility  is the monthly volatility in a 
fiscal year; log_assets,  log_sales,  log_mktcap,  mb, log_age, and kz  are the logarithm of the total assets, the logarithm of the 
annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, the market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, and the Kaplan-
Zingales index at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. An event year is defined as one in which the aggregate insider sale is 
positive. pre_event(t),  event(t),  and post_event(t)  are equal to 1 if year t +1, t,  and t -1 is an event year, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. Insiders are defined as the top-level directors and officers. dictator  is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the 
governance index is equal to or greater than 14, and 0 otherwise (the governance index is derived in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(QJE 2003)). T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates 
significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Table XI: The Effect of Corporate Governance (1990-2006)
Insider Sales SEO
log_ads log_ads_lassets log_ads log_ads_lassets
pre_event(t) 0.009 0.018 0.036 0.027
(0.25) (0.48) (1.86) (1.62)
event(t) 0.019 0.025 0.043 0.042
(0.88) (1.03) (2.17) (2.11)
post_event(t) -0.037 -0.017 0.018 0.026
(-1.95) (-1.42) (0.40) (0.67)
pplay(t-1) -0.073 -0.053 0.020 0.030
(-3.94) (-2.77) (1.43) (1.69)
pre_event(t) * pplay 0.026 0.017 0.010 0.027
(1.63) (1.20) (1.00) (1.53)
event(t) * pplay 0.047 0.038 0.040 0.073
(2.40) (2.39) (2.55) (3.59)
post_event(t) * pplay -0.006 -0.011 -0.039 -0.051
(-0.54) (-1.04) (-1.91) (-2.15)
log_sales(t-1) 0.223 0.369
(17.63) (29.71)
log_assets(t-1) 0.470 0.373
(29.99) (25.74)
log_mktcap(t-1) 0.104 -0.070 0.101 -0.062
(11.29) (-10.22) (12.30) (-10.38)
mb(t-1) 0.015 0.037 0.009 0.033
(7.82) (20.55) (4.89) (18.78)
ret12(t-1) 0.003 0.059 0.017 0.065
(0.46) (8.22) (2.55) (9.97)
log_age(t-1) 0.042 -0.121 -0.022 -0.122
(0.83) (-2.41) (-0.45) (-2.51)
volatility(t-1) -0.128 -0.165 -0.109 -0.120
(-1.90) (-2.40) (-1.71) (-1.83)
turnover(t-1) 0.036 0.020 0.027 0.011
(6.41) (3.43) (4.95) (1.88)
kz(t-1) -0.019 -0.044 -0.022 -0.046
(-4.05) (-9.76) (-5.52) (-9.42)
No Obs 27657 27657 32663 32663
Table XII: Pure Players vs. Congolmerates (1978-2006)
The dependent variable in this table is the logarithm of advertising spending in year t.  Both regression specifications include year 
and firm fixed effects. ret12  is the cumulative return, turnover  is the average monthly turnover, and volatility  is the monthly 
volatility in a fiscal year; log_assets,  log_sales,  log_mktcap,  mb, log_age, and kz  are the logarithm of the total assets, the 
logarithm of the annual sales, the logarithm of the market capitalization, the market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of the firm age, 
and the Kaplan-Zingales index at the end of a fiscal year, respectively. An event year is defined as one in which the aggregate 
insider sale is positive. pre_event(t),  event(t),  and post_event(t)  are equal to 1 if year t +1, t,  and t -1 is an event year, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Insiders are defined as the top-level directors and officers. pplay is an indicator variable, equal to 1 
if the firm only operates in one industry (2-digit SIC code) and 0 otherwise.  T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
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